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A CODE OF ONE'S OWN* 
DEAN JOSEPH P. TOMAIN** 
INTRODUCTION 
Virginia Woolf once wrote that it is the first duty of a lec-
turer "to hand you after an hour's discourse a nugget of pure 
truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep 
on the mantel-piece forever."} She made those remarks in 1928 
when she was asked to give a lecture at the Newnham and Girton 
Colleges, two women's colleges, at Oxford. 
Her assigned topic was women and fiction, which she found 
to be a less than stimulating proposition. Instead of attacking 
her topic frontally and directly, she addressed a small piece of it 
and developed the single point that "a woman must have money 
and a room of her own if she is to write fiction."2 Those lectures 
were subsequently published under the name, A Room of One's 
Own, and I commend these lectures for the force of their lan-
guage, for the wit and insight of Virginia Woolf, but even more 
so for the structure of her argument. 
Like Virginia Woolf, I find the topic of professionalism less 
than stimulating, and here you can read "less than stimulating" 
to mean a topic that threatens to be dry and boring. The word 
"professionalism" tends to make the eyes glaze over because it 
runs toward cliche at one extreme and toward preaching at the 
other. Indeed, it is difficult to find something to say about pro-
fessionalism that has not been said before. Still, professionalism 
does lie at the heart of what we do as lawyers, and it is worth 
pondering. 
* This paper is an exercise of the idea that we can learn about profes-
sionalism by reflecting on the humanities. The paper is modeled after Virginia 
Woolfs A Room of One's Own, which is based on lectures in six chapters. This 
idea was developed through co-teaching a course, entitled "Law in Literature 
and Philosophy," and by attending a Great Books retreat/seminar sponsored by 
the Ohio State Bar Association, called the "Glenmoor Institute of Justice for the 
Legal Profession." 
** Dean and Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College 
of Law. These remarks were delivered at the Keating, Muething & KJekamp 
Legal Update Seminar on December 2, 1999, and at the 40th Annual South-
western Ohio Tax Institute on December 4, 1999. 
1. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 4 (Harvest Book 1989). 
2. Id. 
153 
HeinOnline -- 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 154 2001
154 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBliC POliCY [Vol. 15 
I hope to imitate Woolf by doing here what she did in her 
lectures, which was to talk about a small part of the topic and to 
develop as fully and freely as I can the train of thought which led 
me to these remarks. The small piece of the topic I intend to 
develop is that each of us, as lawyers, needs a code of our own. 
Nevertheless, like Woolf, I am afraid that these remarks will leave 
the true nature of the topic of professionalism unsolved and, like 
Woolf, "[l]ies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be 
some truth mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth 
and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping."3 
Woolf starts by describing her day at the men's college at 
Oxbridge and goes into great detail about a luncheon that began 
with sole and a "counterpane of the whitest cream," followed by 
partridges, "their retinue of sauces and salads," potatoes "thin as 
coins," and ended with "a confection which rose all sugar from 
the waves. To call it a pudding and so relate it to rice and tapioca 
would be an insult."4 She finishes by writing: 
Meanwhile the wineglasses had flushed yellow and flushed 
crimson; had been emptied; had been filled. And thus by 
degrees was lit, halfWay down the spine, which is the seat of 
the soul, not that hard little electric light which we call bril-
liance, as it pops in and out upon our lips, but the more 
profound, subtle, and subterranean glow, which is the rich 
yellow flame of rational intercourse.5 
Mter that luncheon, she talks about dining with a friend in 
the women's college that was less grand by many orders of mag-
nitude and that they were lucky to find hidden in a cupboard 
something to drink. They ate rather ordinary food from plain 
china and she concludes, "The lamp in the spine does not light 
on beef and prunes."6 
Woolfs comparison of the two meals and the circumstances 
of the men's and women's colleges at Oxbridge was as telling as 
it was simple. I make a similar comparison between law practice 
in the "good old days" of the not-too-distant past and law practice 
today as a way of plumbing the depths of professionalism. 
We can recall the good old days oflaw practice twenty-five or 
more years ago. Then, the structure of firms was very simple and 
the rules were very clear. Law firms had only two categories of 
attorneys-partners and associates. Their bills were not itemized 
and were for "services rendered," and there was relative job 
3. Id. at 4-5. 
4. Id. at 10-11. 
5. Id. at 11. 
6. Id. at 18. 
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security, that is, if an associate made partner after three to five 
years, then the associate would be a partner for life, as the firm 
enjoyed a secure and loyal client base. Today's practice, as we 
shall see and as we know, differs markedly. 
Then the public image of lawyers still held the lingering 
memory of Perry Mason, respected the aspirations of Atticus 
Finch, and admired the character of E.G. Marshall in The Defend-
ers. Even later, senior partner Leland McKenzie was a throwback 
to the benevolent despot of a firm, but by the time he was on 
L.A. Law, we could see that younger Turks were squeezing him 
out. Do we really want Ally McBeal and the whining Bobby Don-
nell of The Practice as our model lawyers? Here, however, I must 
admit a guilty fascination with Al Pacino as the lawyer-devil in 
Droil's Advocate. 
Woolf began her remarks about women and fiction by 
reflecting on what the great poets said about the subject. We can 
follow Woolfs path and walk through the halls of the legal acad-
emy; yet, instead of confronting the poets as she does, we con-
front the giants of legal literature. Doing so, we learn from 
Holmes that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience,"7 and that "[t]he common law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sover-
eign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified ... ."8 It is hard to 
find a non-Holmes quote as quotable. Cardozo stated, "My analy-
sis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: 
logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted stan-
dards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combina-
tion shape the progress of the law."g 
I include one of my favorite passages: 
Law reflects, but in no sense determines, the moral worth 
of a society. The values of a reasonably just society will 
reflect themselves in a reasonably just law. The better the 
society, the less law there will be. In Heaven, there will be 
no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb. The val-
ues of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust 
law. The worse the society, the more law there will be. In 
Hell, there will be nothing but law, and due process will be 
meticulously observed. 10 
7. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1963). 
8. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) . 
9. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 
(1921). 
10. GRANT GILMORE, THE ACES OF AMERICAN LAw 110-11 (1977). 
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I suspect that many lawyers have heard all of those quotes 
and all lawyers have heard at least two of them. The great jurists 
and legal scholars are our poets and ought to do for us what the 
poets did for Virginia Woolf, that is, to give us pause to stop and 
reflect about our calling and let their words touch us in some 
way. 
My guess is that these great quotations more often than not 
do not move us. Perhaps these words are too abstract or too gen-
eral. Perhaps they are too familiar. Perhaps they state the unat-
tainable. Perhaps the sentiments are just too grand for the 
pressures of day-to-day law practice. Even if we grant that such 
grand quotes address professionalism, what do they tell us? 
I. NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
Mter reflecting upon her day at Oxbridge, Woolf poses the 
question, "What conditions are necessary for the creation of 
works of art?"11 A similar question is posed for us: What are the 
necessary conditions of professionalism? We can begin to answer 
this question by defining the word "profession." In 1953, Roscoe 
Pound interpreted profession as "pursuing a learned art as a 
common calling in the spirit of public service .... "12 In 1987, 
Pound's definition was adopted by the AB.A's Stanley Commis-
sion in its widely distributed report, ... In the Spirit of Public Ser-
vice: A Blueprint for Rekindling Lawyer Professionalism,13 and that 
definition was adopted again as recently as 1996 in a report of 
the Professionalism Committee of the AB.A Section on Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar, entitled Teaching and 
Learning Professionalism. 14 
The conditions for a profession are easy to state and include: 
(1) learned knowledge; (2) skill in applying laws to facts; (3) 
thorough preparation; (4) practical and prudential wisdom; (5) 
ethical conduct and integrity; (6) dedication to justice and the 
public good.15 The challenge, of course, is to flesh out the con-
11. WOOLF, supra note 1, at 25. 
12. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TiMES 5 
(1953). 
13. A.B.A. COMM'N ON PROF., ... In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprintfor 
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243; see also 
Thomas D. Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 451 
(1985). 
14. A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING 
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REpORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE 5-
6 (1996) [hereinafter TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM]. 
15. Id. at 6-7. 
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tent of these professional characteristics and to construct a mean-
ingful definition of professionalism. 
Woolf's method for answering the question about necessary 
conditions was research, and she conducted hers in the British 
Museum. As Woolf wrote, "[i]f truth is not to be found on the 
shelves of the British Museum, where, I asked myself, picking up 
a notebook and a pencil, is truth?"16 
She was right, of course. The only practical way for a lawyer 
to answer the question about the necessary conditions for profes-
sionalism is through research and where is truth to be found, I 
asked myself, if not in a law library. So charged, I performed two 
types of research. The first type of research was the simple one 
of going through my personal library and looking at the books, 
which affected me as a law student and young lawyer and intrigue 
me even today. While there are books of scholarship that mean 
much to me in my work, those that mean the most to me as a 
lawyer are biographies and stories of great cases. The recent 
biography of John Marshall by Jean Edward Smith17 immediately 
comes to mind as does Evan Thomas' biography of Edward Ben-
nett Williams, The Man To See,IS Sheldon Novick's recent biogra-
phy of Holmes,19 William Harbaugh's biography of John W. 
Davis, Lawyer's Lawyer,20 Roger Newman's Hugo Black,21 and Ger-
ald Gunther's biography of Learned Hand.22 For case studies, 
there is none better than the full story behind Brown v. Board of 
Education,23 in Simple Justicl-4 by Richard Kluger and the highly 
popular A Civil Action.25 These biographies and case studies are 
stories of professionalism and give us more insights into what it 
means to be a professional lawyer than yet another bar report. 
Notice, I have not said anything about John Grisham. I prefer to 
keep him a secret addiction. He writes about professionalism but 
does so by misdirection. His lawyers, for the most part, are 
flawed, and his view of the legal profession is decidedly not opti-
16. WOOLF, supra note 1, at 26. 
17. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARsHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1998). 
18. EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS, ULTI-
MATE INSIDER, LEGENDARY TRIAL ATTORNEY (1992). 
19. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WEN-
DELL HOLMES (1989); see also EDWARD WHITE,JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: 
LAw AND THE INNER SELF (1995). 
20. WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. 
DAVIS (1990). 
21. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HuGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1997). 
22. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1995). 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977). 
25. JONATHAN BARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996). 
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mistic regardless of how lucrative for Mr. Grisham. Still, his sto-
ries do arouse a sense of what counts as professionalism-or not. 
The second form of research that I undertook in my search 
for understanding professionalism was in that great law library 
known as Lexis-Nexis, in other words, the computer. It should 
not surprise anyone to realize that when the word "professional-
ism" is plugged into the computer and a search is performed for 
materials prior to 1980, the computer yields an identifiable num-
ber of articles using that word either in their body or in their 
title. If, however, the word "professionalism" is searched post-
1980, the number of hits is so high that the computer literally 
cannot spit them all out. The topic of professionalism resulted 
in a notably smaller number of traditional law review articles that 
address the topic of professionalism than the number of articles 
appearing in bar journals with the exception of the three jour-
nals dedicated to legal ethics.26 
You are many times more likely to find articles on profes-
sionalism in the journals and publications of bar associations 
than in law reviews, and I think there are three reasons why you 
should read the articles in the bar journals rather than in tradi-
tionallaw reviews first. The primary reason is that bar association 
journals tend to be a lot more readable; let me give you an 
example. 
The American Bar Association House of Delegates in August 
1988 adopted a Creed of Professionalism which is not dissimilar 
to that adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court. Both documents 
are worth reading. The bibliography to the A.B.A. 's Professional-
ism Creed cites several law review articles on professionalism, and 
the first citation is to an article, entitled Toward a Modem/ 
PostModem Reconstruction oj Ethics. 27 The article opens with a few 
lines from a poem by Coleridge, and then the author writes, "In 
his poem Coleridge recounts the futile meanderings of a narcis-
sistic self, a self he broadly identified with the modern liberal 
subject constituted in the bourgeois democratic revolutions."28 
That is the first sentence of the article. Nearly 90 pages and 393 
footnotes later, the author concludes: 
The moment of commitment is aesthetic in its orientation. 
It demands not only the capacity for judgment, but also the 
ability to dream of what-is-not-yet. The ethical cannot be 
26. The Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy; The Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics, and the Journal of the Legal Profession. 
27. Drucilla Cornell, Toward a M.odernlPostModern Reconstruction of Ethics, 
133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985). 
28. [d. at 292. 
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reduced to an aesthetic, but neither can it do without an 
aesthetic. There is a truth, then, in Unger's romantic 
vision of transcendence and context-smashing. The loss to 
our shared ethical life would be great indeed if the 
dreamer in each of us were to be silenced.29 
159 
Does such writing really help the cause? The philosophical 
field of professional ethics is indeed important, and there are 
significant contributions from legal ethics scholars.30 Still, pro-
fessional ethics are applied ethics and, as such, intelligibility is a 
valuable attribute. 
The second reason, in addition to readability, is that articles 
in bar journals are short, and the third is that, for the most part, 
they are written by lawyers. Now short, lawyerly articles may be 
readable, but they are not necessarily profound and oftentimes 
become too specific. For example, surfing through the list of 
professionalism articles yields such titles as: Ethics and Professional-
ism in Oil and Gas Practice31 and Ethics and Professionalism for the 
Family Law Practitioner.32 The list also includes every bar associa-
tion President's message or column in every monthly edition of 
every journal ever printed. One only prays, then, for that much 
needed article, The End of Professionalism. 
A moment ago, I noted that these articles have the advan-
tage of being short and readable, but that they are not profound. 
Unfortunately, when one does find the more profound, or at 
least the more thought-provoking literature, it is not a very pretty 
sight. At this juncture, I would point you to four recent, impor-
tant books about the legal profession33 and a law review article34 
that generated much controversy. These publications together 
29. [d. at 380. 
30. See, e.g., THE GoOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 
(David Luban ed. 1983); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 
(1988); and WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAw. 
YERS' Ethics (1998). See also JOHN KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 
(1988). 
31. James N. Castleberry, Jr., Ethics and Professionalism in Oil and Gas Prac-
tice, 42 INS. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 6-1 (1991). 
32. St. B. of Tex, Advanced Family Law Course: Ethics and Professional-
ism for the Family Law Practitioner (July 1990). 
33. MARy ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETI' 17-108 (1994); 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE 
END OF THE TWENTIETH Century (1994); Michael H. Trotter, Profit and the 
Practice of Law: What's Happened to the Legal Profession (1997). 
34. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). 
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with a significant research paper published by the A.B.A.-the 
MacCrate Report-have been deeply critical of the legal profession 
as a whole, which is to say the bench, the bar, and the academy.35 
These criticisms are worth reading; yet, they tell only a partial 
story of professionalism. 
There are two significant and important things to note 
about these publications. First, they represent an Ivy League cri-
tique. One book is written by the Dean of the Yale Law School, 
another by a professor at the Harvard Law School, a third by a 
Harvard-trained senior partner at a major national law firm, and 
the fourth book is written by a Cornell law graduate and former 
ambassador and general counsel for a major Fortune 100 com-
pany. The article is authored by a very respected judge of the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Harry J. Edwards, and is still gen-
erating controversy today. And the progenitor of the MacCrate 
Report is a senior partner of the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm. 
To call these analyses an Ivy League critique is not to do so 
in any pejorative or condescending way. Rather, if the best and 
the brightest among us are critiquing our profession, then we 
should pay attention. 
More importantly, the second significant, and for me very 
troubling, aspect of these analyses is that the critique is internal, 
coming from the members of our profession. More and more 
lawyers are experiencing dissatisfaction about their work lives, 
and this is cause for concern. This concern is particularly acute 
for the legal educators among us who are preparing students to 
enter the profession. 
The basic critique has become a mantra at bar association 
meetings: law is becoming more of a business and less of a profession. 
Nevertheless, if one is going to write a book-length treatment of 
that slogan, one has to have more to say than that, and indeed 
the critics do. 
To better appreciate the current situation of professional-
ism, we can benefit from understanding the more specific criti-
ques of the legal profession and of legal education. These 
critiques, in tum, reveal much about how society views lawyers; 
and, more introspectively, how lawyers view themselves. 
In fairly brief compass, we can survey four decades of cri-
tique. In the 1960's, the critique of the legal profession was that 
35. See A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDue. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 
(1992) [hereinafter MACeRATE REpORT]; see also LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' 
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert N. 
Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
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access to the profession and to law was denied, particularly to 
women and minorities, as well as to the poor. In the 1970's, the 
critique was that the quality of lawyering was suffering; this cri-
tique was led by no less a personage than the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court, Warren Burger. In the 1980's, the 
critique ranged from persons as disparate as Dan Quayle to Bill 
Clinton to Lester Thurow, who argued that the productivity oflaw-
yers was a negative productivity and a drain on our economy. 
Finally, in the 1990's, the critique was one about values, led by 
the Ivy Leaguers to whom I have already referred. 
Critics of legal education were equally forceful in their eval-
uation. In the 1960's, the critique was that law was too formal, 
too doctrinal, and in the argot of the time, was not "relevant." In 
the 1970's, presumably in an effort to become more relevant, was 
a period that we can call the "law and ... " period. Law & Eco-
nomics. Law & Literature. Law & Sociology. I must offer a dis-
claimer at this point. My disagreement with the "law and ... " 
movement is not that it had nothing to offer to the law. Indeed, 
learning about literature, economics, and politics have been very 
illuminating and enjoyable and I teach them in my courses. The 
criticism is that these efforts do not offer full and complete theo-
ries of law as they sometimes purport to do. They provide 
insights and useful information; they do not explain law. The 
1980's was a period of "fancy theory," a term coined by Harvard's 
Professor Duncan Kennedy, himself a progenitor of fancy theory 
as he brought to the legal academy continental philosophers, 
such as Hans Gadamer, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault. 
The quotation earlier from Drucilla Cornell has embedded in it 
these influences. The critique of the 1990's is in some fashion a 
culmination of all that preceded it insofar as, to use Judge 
Edwards' phrase, there is a growing disjunction between legal 
education and law practice, a disjunction that the Macerate Report 
sought to repair. 
The critiques of the legal profession and of legal education 
reflected and informed the public perception of law and lawyers. 
In the 1960's, the public perception was that social justice was 
lacking in our society and this was the decade of "movements," 
including the Civil Rights Movement, the Anti-War Movement, 
the Women's Movement, and the beginnings of the environmen-
tal and consumer movements. 
Largely because of Watergate, the 1970's were seen as a dec-
ade of a breach of faith. Lawyers hurt our government in such 
deep ways that I wonder if we have recovered from our cynicism. 
Indeed, the proliferation of "gates"-Irangate, Whitewatergate, 
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Monicagate-seem to have left us immune to the damage to the 
law and to our governmental institutions. 
As if things were not bad enough for lawyers, in the 1980's, 
lawyers, as well as investment bankers, were caught up in the 
"greed is good" phenomenon of Wall Street. In the 1990's, soci-
ety saw simply too much law, particularly as we stretched class 
action lawsuits to their most greedy breaking point. 
In her trip through the British Museum, Virginia Woolf 
found a bunch of men writing about women and found most of 
the writing to be angry. It seems obvious to me, of course, that 
the critiques that we have just described also express anger and 
provoke the same question that Virginia Woolf raised" [W] hy are 
they angry?"36 
I believe that we can explain the surface anger very easily. 
The critics are angry about a loss of innocence. In other words, 
the critiques are a form of nostalgia. The critics are angry at hav-
ing lost the good old days, a calmer time, a more peaceful time, a 
time of more camaraderie, a time when the rules were under-
stood and things were done informally, and a time in which a 
lawyer's future was relatively secure. 
But isn't there always something behind the anger? Doesn't 
fear lurk there? Aren't the cries for greater civility and greater 
professionalism attempts to reduce our anger as well as dispel 
our fears? But fear of what? Certainly not a fear of a lost past 
that perhaps never was. 
II. A MAss OF INFORMATION 
Again, Woolf is instructive. In order to understand the 
anger and the fear, she wrote, "What one wants, I thought ... is a 
mass of information."37 I agree. 
Perhaps we can best understand our current situation with 
information. In his book, Profit and the Practice of Law, Michael H. 
Trotter, a senior lawyer in Atlanta, writes: 
The years 1960 to 1995 witnessed the transformation of 
corporate law firms in America from small, dignified, pros-
perous, conservative, white male professional partnerships 
dedicated to serving their clients and communities into 
large, aggressive, wealthy, self-promoting, diverse business 
organizations where money is often valued more highly 
than service to clients or community.38 
36. WOOLF, supra note 1, at 33. 
37. [d. at 45. 
38. TROTfER, supra note 33, at xv. 
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The data surrounding changes in the legal profession supports 
Trotter's c1aim.39 In 1960, the total number of lawyers in the 
United States was 285,933-or slightly over one-quarter of a mil-
lion lawyers-or 1 lawyer for every 627 persons.40 In 1970, the 
ratio dropped to 1 lawyer for every 572 persons.4! In 1980, the 
United States had 1 lawyer for every 418 persons.42 In 1990, 
there were 770,1l9-or over three-quarters of a million law-
yers-or 1 for every 320 persons.43 I suspect that in the year 
2000, we can look forward to a Million Lawyer March or 1 lawyer 
for every 250 persons, and by the year 2023, to steal a line from 
Dean Robert Clark of the Harvard Law School, if the trends con-
tinue, we will have more lawyers than people.44 
The shift relative to women and minorities among the bar is 
also noticeable. In 1965, women constituted 4.2% of all law stu-
dents.45 This figure jumped to 8.6% in 1970, 34.2% in 1980, and 
42.5% in 1991.46 Law schools have been graduating as many, if 
not more, women than men for the last dozen or more years. In 
short, there is parity in the younger bar between men and 
women, but not for minorities. In 1970, minorities constituted 
4.3% of all law students and in 1990, 13.1 %,47 which is still below 
national averages. 
In addition to demographics, other data is quite illuminat-
ing. In 1960, the largest firm in America was the New York City 
firm of Shearman, Sterling, and Wright with 125 lawyers and 
starting salaries of about $500 per month or $6,000 per year.48 
Today, the larger firms are ten times that size and a 125-lawyer 
operation is a small firm in a big city. Starting salaries are $500 
per day and are topping $120,000 per year with signing bonuses 
reportedly up to $50,000.49 Clearly, firms have become larger, 
39. See generally MACeRATE REpORT, supra note 35; Robert C. Clark, Why So 
Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 275 (1992); RICHARD 
A. EpSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 1-17 (1995); Stephen P. 
Magee, The optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 667 
(1993); and Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American Lawyers: A Demographic 
Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 345 
(1994). 




44. Clark, supra note 39, at 275 n.1. 
45. MACeRATE REpORT, supra note 35, at 18. 
46. Id. 
47. Nelson, supra note 39, at tbU3. 
48. TROTTER, supra note 33, at 9. 
49. See generally THE NATIONAL AssOCIATION FOR LAw PlACEMENT, 
NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2000). 
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and have expanded their services to lobbying, consulting, policy 
planning, and multidisciplinary practice (MDP). Today, law 
practice involves beauty contests, blended rates, multiple tracks, 
management committees, professional managers, newsletters, 
marketing, discounting, and consultants of all sorts. In today's 
world, mentoring has been replaced by associate leverage. "Ser-
vices rendered" has become the billable hour and the path to 
partnership is less secure. Even a name on the letterhead lacks 
permanence. 
The practice of law also has changed significantly with new 
types of technology and new types of publicity. Such things as 
websites, business links, electronic communications, paperless tri-
als, Internet access, counsel connect, and faxes and voicemail 
have put time pressures on the practice of law unknown to us 
previously. The law business has become a subject of national 
interest, as demonstrated by such publications as the National 
Law Journal, the American Lawyer, Court TV; and the regular law 
sections of The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. These 
changes have also led to greater democratization of law practice, 
just like the greater democratization of every other social institu-
tion. What is sometimes difficult to recognize is that there are 
costs associated with that greater democratization. So be it. We 
have the training to weather the challenges and rekindle the 
spirit of professionalism. 
The consequence of changes in demographics and changes 
in the practice of law is increased competition and decreased loy-
alty. There is increased competition from non-lawyers, and 
increased competition for lawyers and clients. There is increased 
competition from in-house counsel. There is decreased loyalty 
between associates and partners and between clients and lawyers. 
These changes have resulted in a more competitive environment. 
I believe increased competition and decreased loyalty is the 
basis of our fears about the profession. Most apparent is the lack 
of job security for lawyers. Becoming partner is no longer like 
tenure. Also, because competition is keen, so too are the risks 
and rewards. A lawyer can make fabulous amounts of money. 
Are we afraid of being seduced by such extravagance? Are we 
fearful of being perceived as naive if we do not? Most impor-
tantly, concerns about security and compensation combined with 
increased pressures for billable hours have two pernicious effects. 
Such pressures contribute to the increasing dissatisfaction of law-
yers with their professional lives and erode a commitment to 
professionalism. 
However, one can regard these changes more positively. 
Yes, competition has increased; yes, more varied jobs are availa-
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ble; yes, there are more opportunities. With a small amount of 
creative insight and entrepreneurial spirit, lawyers today can fash-
ion law practices that are different and exciting, which deliver 
services to clients in need. Also, lawyers can develop a code of 
our own. 
III. THE IDEAL OF THE LAWYER STATESMAN 
Perhaps the most trenchant of the critics of the legal profes-
sion is Anthony Kronman, the Dean of the Yale Law School and 
author of The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession.50 
Dean Kronman took his ideal-type-the lawyer-statesman-from 
a speech by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who referred to 
some of the great lawyers of history, namely Thomas Jefferson, 
Alexander Hamilton, Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson, John 
McCoy, and RobertJackson. To the list we can add great judges 
and advocates, such as Daniel Webster, Rufus Choate, and the 
two Marshalls, John and Thurgood. 
For Kronman, the basic elements of the lawyer-statesman 
consist of being a devoted citizen who cares about the public 
good, has a special talent for discovering where the public good 
lies, and knows how to fashion arrangements needed to secure it. 
The essential aspect of the lawyer-statesman's work is "to help 
those on whose behalf he is deliberating come to a better under-
standing of their own ambitions, interests, and ideals and to 
guide their choice among alternative goals."51 According to 
Dean Kronman, the lawyer-statesman distinguishes herself by the 
exceptional wisdom she displays as well as her great excellence in 
the art of deliberation. In fact, this wisdom is a trait of character; 
it is a trait of habitual feelings and desires. Indeed, what we call 
judicial temperament is the temperament of the supreme lawyer-
statesman. Preeminent among those abilities is the trait of pru-
dence or practical wisdom. The only way a lawyer can achieve 
the ideal of a lawyer-statesman is by acquiring these values of 
character. In another article, Dean Kronman says: 
The good lawyer . . . is the lawyer who possesses the full 
complement of emotional and perceptual and intellectual 
powers that are needed for goodjudgment, a lawyer's most 
important and valuable trait. The process of training to 
become a lawyer. : . [involves gathering] the soul's powers 
50. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAlLING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1993). 
51. KRONMAN, supra note 33, at 15. 
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in a way that confinns one's sense of wholeness as a person 
and sense of being wholly engaged by one's work .... 52 
In talking about ideal types, we risk distancing ourselves 
from acquiring such traits because they seem remote and availa-
ble only to the extraordinary. That distancing is a mistake. 
While it is likely that only one of us will be the next Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court, it is a near certainty that we 
will be in a position to advise a client and help him improve his 
life. As lawyers, our daily calling is to help people realize their 
dreams to build a business or an estate, to promote an idea, to 
fight for their rights. As lawyers we also protect people from 
their fears of the state and from abuses of public and private 
power. Such advice takes the prudence and talent of the lawyer-
statesman. 
For quite some time I was highly critical of such nostalgia, 
believing it to be misplaced, because I felt that Kronman and 
other critics were yearning for a time that never was. Criticisms 
that law was more of a business and less of a profession have 
always been with us, and we can point to historical examples 
galore to demonstrate that lawyers have never been the most 
beloved souls on earth. Now, however, I think that if we look 
more deeply at how law is practiced today, we might see the cri-
tique as something more than misplaced nostalgia. 
IV. LAw PRACTICE TODAY 
In her journey through modern literature in preparation for 
her talk, Virginia Woolf uncovered a fictional author, named 
Mary Carmichael. In Carmichael's writing, she found that, 
"[f]ear and hatred were almost gone .... "53 What she found in 
Cannichael's writing was a sense of a woman writing in her own 
voice without obsessing about past injustices or about a past time. 
Mary Carmichael, the reader is led to believe, was a living 
writer whose fiction had a peculiar authenticity because Mary 
wrote, not in opposition to men writers, but wrote true to herself. 
I suggest that in trying to understand professionalism, we con-
sider following the path of Mary Carmichael and think about our 
own lives as lawyers as distinguished from what some lofty critics 
have tried to tell us about the subject. I think it would be wrong-
headed for us to believe that the practice of law today is so simi-
lar to what it had been that the old structures and fonns are 
sufficient. 
52. Anthony T. Kronman, Chapman University School of Law Groundbreaking 
Ceremony Friday, November 21, 1997, 1 CHAPMAN L. REv. 1, 5 (1998). 
53. WOOLF, supra note 1, at 92. 
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There are deep changes in the nature and practice of law. 
The traditional paradigm of lawsuits was that they were bipolar. 
In other words, each lawsuit had a plaintiff and a defendant and 
the winner took all. In its most basic form, a lawsuit involved the 
resolution of a past dispute and lawsuits were not relational. In 
other words, at the conclusion of a case, plaintiff and defendant 
went their merry ways. 
In lawsuits today, however, we can point to health care, the 
environment, class actions, transactional work, international 
work, telecommunications, and all types of intellectual property 
as examples to see that modem lawsuits hardly fit the traditional 
paradigm. Today, the new lawsuits are multi-party, involving 
public and private interests represented by individual and institu-
tional parties. They are multijurisdictional, involving multiple 
states, as well as federalism issues. They are also multi-fora. In 
other words, lawsuits are carried out at the negotiating table, 
before administrative law judges, and in legislatures, as well as 
before the bench. In addition, the new lawsuits not only look to 
past disputes for resolution, they also look to future relations. 
The whole alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement 
speaks to this phenomenon. While it is true that issues in the 
past must be settled, it is most often the case that parties will have 
a continuing relationship post-lawsuit and that their future must 
be made to work as smoothly as possible. 
In addition, the new lawsuits have interdisciplinary complex-
ities. Many suits involve economics at a high level, as well as sci-
ence and technology to degrees that none of us can really 
master. In addition, today's lawsuits are fraught with normative 
and positive uncertainties. In other words, these suits are based 
upon guesses about what the future will hold. The whole nature 
of class action lawsuits, for example, is based upon guesses of the 
probabilities of the number of lawsuits and the probabilities of 
successful litigation. In short, these types of complex lawsuits, 
filled with the uncertainties that they are, increase business risk. 
It is no wonder that firms are growing larger as the demands of 
clients grow larger, and the need to reduce uncertainty becomes 
compelling because it is a way of reducing business and financial 
risks to clients. 
This shift in the nature of today's legal issues is neither 
good, nor bad-it simply is. As lawyers, we should be trained to 
deal with law's dynamism and do so efficiently and effectively. 
The shift brings more challenges, of course, but who better to 
meet these challenges than lawyers? Do we really want to cede 
this ground to Andersen Consulting? 
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The slogan that "law has become more of a business and less 
of a profession" is not without some basis in fact. The tougher 
question is how do we wish to regard this phenomenon and what 
does it have to do with professionalism? 
V. A CODE OF ONE's OWN 
In the last chapter of her book, Virginia Woolf says that for a 
woman writer, indeed for all writers, to be true to their art, they 
must have a unity of the mind, in which she means that there 
ought to be harmony within themselves regarding how women 
and men view each other. 54 My thesis is that we should have a 
unity of mind; we should be in harmony with the realities of law 
practice. Law practice embraces both the business and the pro-
fession and embraces the traditional and the contemporary situa-
tion of the law. The lawyering skills that we learned in law 
school, the aspirational ideals that excited us, and the contribu-
tions we make to society are as pertinent today as they were 
yesterday. 
Professionalism is simply a code of one's own. What consti-
tutes that code is what excites us and what attracted us to the 
practice of law. We can begin to construct that code if we ask 
ourselves very simple questions such as: Why did we go to law 
school in the first place? I suspect for most, if not for all of us, 
there are multiple and vague answers to the question. We 
weren't diligent (read smart) enough to become doctors. We 
reached law through a process of elimination. We saw law as an 
opportunity to do good things and make big money. We saw law 
as a way to be a leader and a positive figure in the community. 
It may be the case that answering the question of why we 
went to law school does not yield a tremendous amount of infor-
mation. Let me pose other questions then. 
As a law student or young lawyer, when you were studying a 
case or researching an issue, were you ever impressed by legal 
reasoning and saw what the mathematicians call elegance? If so, 
you have just uncovered a story of craft. 55 
Similarly, as a law student or a young lawyer reading an opin-
ion, did you ever perceive that a case was legally correct and mor-
ally wrong? If so, you have experienced a story of justice. 
As a law student or young lawyer, were you ever impressed by 
the temperament and dispassionate analysis or problem-solving 
54. See id. at ch.6. 
55. See James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft and Failure, 73 KY. L. J. 
937 (1984). 
HeinOnline -- 15 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 169 2001
2001] A CODE OF ONE'S OWN 169 
ability of a lawyer or judge or teacher? IT so, you have observed a 
story of character. 
These stories of craft, justice, and character are all stories of 
professionalism. I am willing to bet that we have all had one or 
all of these experiences. I would even go further and suggest 
that if you have had none of these experiences, then this is the 
wrong profession for you. These stories are within us; they are 
within our daily lives. They constitute a code of professionalism 
that we can design for ourselves and call our own. 
In conclusion, and again following Woolf, I should say that, 
"[h]ere I would stop, but the pressure of convention decrees that 
every speech must end with a peroration . . . . I find myself say-
ing briefly and prosaically that it is much more important to be 
oneself than anything else."56 At this point then, I recommend 
two books that read together can stimulate your thinking about 
the unity of mind of bridging professionalism and business to 
allow one to develop a code of one's own. The first book, by 
David H. Maister, is entitled True Professionalism: The Courage to 
Care About Your People, Your Clients, and Your Career.57 Maister is a 
business consultant and his book reads like that of any other 
management type, but his message is a real one. IT lawyers and 
law firms think in a more business-like way, then they will act 
more professionally. Law firms must go beyond the bottom-line 
and assess the needs of their clients and the needs of their law-
yers and staff. They must invest in human capital more so than 
in capital technology. IT so, then they will increase value to cli-
ents and will increase the service and loyalty to staff and to young 
lawyers. They will also increase the satisfactions from practice 
because it will be building a more successful firm. 
The other book is by Steven Keeva and entitled Transforming 
Practices: Finding Joy and Satisfaction in the Legal Life. 58 Keeva 
unabashedly writes about the "spirituality" of the practice of law. 
Keeva is a senior editor of the ABA Journal/Lawyers Magazine and 
is ajoumalist by profession. His book makes the point that there 
are real lives involved in what we do and that there is real service 
to be delivered and that our greatest asset is that we can deliver 
that service to real people. Our jobs are dynamic and through 
the successful delivery of legal services, we increase our own abili-
ties and talents. I recommend these books because, unlike the 
56. WOOLF, supra note 1, at 110-11. 
57. DAVID H. MAiSTER, TRUE PROFESSIONALISM: THE COURAGE TO CARE 
ABoUT YOUR PEOPLE, YOUR CLIENTS, AND YOUR CAREER (1997). 
58. STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING PRACrICES: FINDING JOY AND SATISFAC-
TION IN THE LEGAL LIFE (1999). 
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others I have mentioned, these have something positive to say 
about being a lawyer. 
Earlier this fall, I attended a seminar for senior lawyers, 
judges, and law teachers, entitled. The Glenmoor Institute of Justice 
for the Legal Profession. Over the course of four days, in sumptuous 
surroundings, with copious cocktails and fine dining and with a 
series of readings from the "Great Books," we discussed our lives 
in the law. We also discussed general questions, such as the 
nature of justice, the nature of professionalism, the nature of ser-
vice, and the future of the legal profession and its image. While 
we had background readings, the significant bases for discussion 
were the contributions of the participants. The beauty of having 
experienced lawyers, judges, and teachers at a seminar table was 
that their experiences deeply informed the discussion. What we 
found was that without directly addressing the topic, we talked 
about professionalism, its character and its elements based upon 
our experiences and based upon our hopes for what the practice 
of law could be for us and for others. Those issues are alive in 
each of us and need only to be addressed. I invite you to do so as 
you construct a code of your own. 
I hope that these remarks have not been the usual fare for a 
professionalism discussion. I further hope to have left you with 
some small "confection which rose all sugar from the waves" 
rather than with "beef and prunes." 
